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Abstract
I study the incentive that governments have to protect IPR in a trading
world economy, focusing on the patent novelty requirement and its eﬀect
on growth an trade. I consider a world economy with ongoing innova-
tion in two regions. The North is assumed to have a higher wage than
the South, possibly a larger market for innovative products and a greater
capacity for innovation. I introduce the heterogeneity of innovation size
together with the obligation, given by Patent Oﬃce of each region, that the
innovation size be higher than the patent novelty requirement. This patent
characteristic stands to be a useable instrument to promote innovation and
growth, and also a strategic trade policy instrument. I numerically deter-
mine the Nash equilibrium of the strategic game that results of the setting
of patent’s novelty requirement by each regional authority. Then I study
eﬀects of an harmonization of the two patent systems, that is the setting
of a common patent novelty requirement by a supra-regional organization.
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1Introduction
Since the agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights
(the TRIPS Agreement) has been ratiﬁed in 1994, stipulating that all members
of the World Trade Organization must adopt a set of universal minimum stan-
dards on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, theoretical studies have
balanced the pros and the cons of this agreement. The general point of view is
that the terms of the agreement are based on the prevailing standards in devel-
oped countries (the North) at the time of the negotiation and that the southern
countries are thus forced to strengthen their IPR protection. Most of all pre-
vious multi-sectorial North-South Trade model build to analyze IPR protection
have focused on the length of patent or discussed the eﬀect of a reduction of the
rate of imitation of northern products by southern ﬁrms (Helpman [1993], Lai
[1998], Kwan and Lai [2003], Lai and Qiu [2003], Grossman and Lai [2004] for
example1). Economists have studied eﬀects of TRIP agreement on tariﬀs( Q i u
and Lai (2005)), on trade (Maskus and Penubarti (1995)), on the incentive to
license for northern ﬁrms (Yang and Maskus (2001)) and have quantiﬁed its im-
pact in terms of transfer (McCalman (2001)2). There exists a consensus around
the fact that this agreement leads to a reinforcement of IPR protection in the
southern countries and a welfare decrease for the consumers of these countries.
Following the development of the Industrial Organization literature, three
characteristics deﬁne the patent: its length (its statutory life), its breadth (the
ﬁeld cover by a single patent) and its height (the stringency of the granting
process).
It seems to us important to take into account the height of the patent,
in place of its length, to analyze the eﬀect of the TRIP agreement, since the
patent law harmonization at the world level that follows this agreement, denies
the use of patent length as an instrument to regulate innovation and growth (a
unique statutory life exists), whereas stringency of patent examination during
the granting process will always present some national speciﬁcities and still
remains a usable instrument. The IPR protection harmonization that follows
the TRIP agreement leads to the adoption of a worldwide standard for the patent
system but does not, to our knowledge, encompasses the granting process. The
patent’s novelty requirement still preserves the capacity to be set by national
authority.
In this paper, I thus study the incentive that governments have to protect
intellectual property in a trading world economy, focusing on the patent novelty
requirement (patent height) and its eﬀect on growth an trade. I consider a
world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries or regions (the North
1The ﬁndings of the two last articles (Grossman and Lai [2004] and Lai and Qiu [2003])
are discussed in details hereafter since these are the closest studies to the present one.
2Developing countries are major contributors but some northern nations also have sizable
contributions (Canada, UK, Japan...).
2and the South). The North is assumed to have a higher wage than the South,
possibly a larger market for innovative products and a greater capacity for
innovation. Nowadays, we can notice an increase of innovative activities in
poor or middle-income countries (Brazil, Korea, China) so it seems important
to build a model apt for studying the relation between trading partners with
positive but diﬀerent abilities to conduct research and development, in order
to determine whether they will set diﬀerent level of patent height. I derive the
Nash equilibrium of a game in which the two regions set their patents’ novelty
requirement simultaneously and noncooperatively. I numerically establish the
best response functions for the North and the South and then characterize the
regionally optimal patent height level in a non-cooperative regime of patent
protection where governments set the patent novelty requirement. Next, I study
the eﬀect of the implementation of an international patent agreement leading to
a harmonized level of the patent’s novelty requirement set by a supra-national
organization. I depart from the general point of view that developing countries
(the South) have to strengthen substantially their level of IPR protection. The
harmonization of the South IPR standards with the northern one not inevitably
leads to more stringent IPR when we focus on patent’s height characteristic
rather that length as most of all previous studies have done.
My ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.
• For plausible values of key parameters of the model, I compare the Nash
equilibrium IPR protection standards of the South and the North (their
patents’ novelty requirements), and ﬁnd that the latter is weaker that
the former when the long-term growth rates are similar (there exists a
worldwide growth rate level).
• This rather counter-factual view is based and the lower level of the south-
ern wage which gives an advantage to the south in the quality-price compe-
tition between the regional leaders in each diﬀerentiated product’s sector.
The North can beneﬁciate of its greater capacity in research and easily
catch the common growth rate without setting a very high level of the
patent’s novelty requirement. On the contrary, to catch up the common
growth rate, the South must adopt a higher Patent’s novelty requirement
in order to elevate its quality growth rate. The south must have chosen
a innovation policy promoting few radical innovations rather than numer-
ous incremental innovations. Doing this the South rises the level of its
mark-up (this is the ineﬃciency eﬀect of patent) but the lowest level of its
wage rate enables the south to keep some advantage in the competition
for diﬀerentiated products market leadership.
• The eﬀect of the IPR harmonization is thus not the one generally depicted
in the literature since the South has to weaken its patent’s novelty require-
3ment level to adopt the worldwide standard, this latest being lower than
the northern one in the Nash equilibrium.
• The harmonization weakly decreases the level of welfare in the South
whereas it increases the welfare level in the North. A compensation mea-
sure could be introduced as an evolution of trade barrier on traditional
product always existing in the North. A given level of compensation can
make the harmonization process acceptable for both regions.
• Worldwide harmonization of patent’s novelty requirement is not the solu-
tion that maximizes the weighted welfare of the two region since a coop-
erative equilibrium can increase the worldwide welfare with heterogenous
patent’s novelty requirement between the two regions.
The model is presented in the ﬁrst section. I determine the balanced growth
equilibrium and establish the northern and southern reaction functions, depend-
ing on the levels of patent’s novelty requirement of both regions, in section 2.
The results of numerical simulations of the model enabling to determine the
Nash equilibrium and the harmonized patent protection equilibrium are pre-
sented in section 3. I discuss the results of the model and compare them with
those of closest studies. I present some loose ends of the model and conclude.
1 The model
1.1 Preliminaries
There are two traded sectors in each regions: a vertically diﬀerentiated goods
sector and a traditional goods sector. Region k government sets a threshold
sk for the novelty requirement, that every patent application must complete
for being granted (that is the size of the vertically innovation must be superior
to sk). Both governments announce and immediately enforce patent novelty
requirement sS and sS respectively for all goods invented. Verticals innovations,
that must be patented, take place in the diﬀerentiated products sectors. An
innovation corresponds to an increase of one of the sectorial quality levels of
the diﬀerentiated goods sectors. In each period, resources are allocated or not
to the research sector in order to improve the quality of existing diﬀerentiated
products. We assume that the sets of diﬀerentiated products in the North and
South are completely intersecting so that consumers of both regions choose
to consume the good with the best quality-price ratio for each diﬀerentiated
industry, whatever the region in which the good have been invented and being
produced. Thus, the continuum of diﬀerentiated products split in two parts.
One part of the continuum corresponds to diﬀerentiated products for which the
quality-price leadership belongs to northern ﬁrms. The other part corresponds
to sector for which the quality-price ratio is at the advantage of southern ﬁrms.
41.2 Households
We assume that households worldwide share the same preferences. The in-






e−ρτdτ with i = N,S
indicating the region (N for the north and S for the south). The instantaneous




















































+(1 − σ)logCS (t)
(2)
Lets Ei
t be the household consumption expenses in region i. xi
z (t) is the level
of consumption of the variety z of the continuum of diﬀerentiated goods which
quality is qi
z (t). Products of the continuum of diﬀerentiated goods are sorted
depending of the localization of the purveyor of the state-of-the-art good. The
continuum [0,1] has been split between goods that are produced in the North
(z ∈ [0,n]) and goods that are produced in the South (z ∈ [n,1]). The n(t)-
variable represents, at time t, the fraction of industries in which the quality-price
ratio is greater in the North than in the South. Households also consumed a
traditional good in quantity Ci (t) which is tradeable in the other region and
is produced by competitive ﬁrms in each region. Depending on best available
price the South would serve all the northern demand for traditional product if
there were no restriction on the northern importations since we assume that
the North has a higher wage rate than the South3. Nevertheless, we postulate
that a fraction of the traditional good production is still manufactured in the
northern region. We can easily justify this latest assertion by protectionist
measure enforced by the North (like imports quota).
The continuum of diﬀerentiated goods is the same for both regions. Only the
ﬁrm, localized in one of the two regions, who exhibits the best quality-price ratio
and has a patent been granted on this product, will produce the good for the
two markets (the national and the foreign one). Imitation of foreign patents by
national ﬁrm is not taken into account. Both regions have innovative capacity
which is an important diﬀerence with the usual framework used to assess the
results of worldwide patent harmonization when the South is often assumed to
have only imitation capacities (see for example Helpman [1993], Kwan and Lai
[2003] or Dinopoulos and Segerstrom [2004]).
3This feature of the model creates an impossibility to determinate the steady-state equi-
librium solution and thus to solve the model, so that we have to keep at least a small fraction
of traditional good production in the northern region even if the wage rate is greater than in
the southern region.
5From a technical point of view, the assertion that the continuum of diﬀeren-
tiated goods is identical between the two regions leads to the fact that a quality
ladder exists for each sector of the continuum in both regions. The sectorial
level of quality in each region evolves (that is climbs up the quality ladder)
with its own rhythm depending on research intensity and productivity but also
on the level of the patent novelty requirement set by the region’s authority.
This hypothesis is rather strong since it implicates that there is no technical
and scientiﬁc informations diﬀusion between the two regions4 (no knowledge
externalities and no reverse engineering).
At each period, representative consumers (we consider that there is Li iden-
tical consumers in the region i which can be interpreted as the market size
in region i) maximize their instantaneous utilities subject to their budget con-








z (t)dz where pi
z (t) is the price
of the diﬀerentiated product z d e v e l o p e di nr e g i o ni, Ei (t) is expenditure in re-
gion i and σ the fraction of expenditures dedicated to diﬀerentiated goods.
The representative consumers’ instantaneous demand for product z (the dif-
ferentiated products) whose patent is in vigor, and for traditional good which is
manufactured in the region that exhibits the lowest production cost (we allow
for a production of a fraction δ of the traditional product in the northern region,



























1.3 The research sector
We describe the research process, aimed to improve the quality level of diﬀer-
entiated product in each sector, by two steps. In the ﬁrst one we establish the
qualitative increment probability distribution of a patentable innovation. In the
other step, we characterize the probability to realize a patentable innovation.
The innovation size probability distribution is Pareto, enabling to describe the
increasing diﬃculty to realize quality improvement of greater size. The prob-
ability to realize an patentable innovation is modelized with a Poisson process
4This hypothesis is quite similar to the one made by Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers
[2003] in their quality ladders model with duopoly. These authors consider that the leader ﬁrm
in quality can cumulate its technological advance on the other ﬁrm. I transpose this framework
to technological competition between sectoral quality leaders from both regions. Grossman
and Helpman [1991, Chapter 8] also postulate the absence of knowledge externalities between
both countries in their two countries model, even if they point out that this hypothesis is
rather unrealistic.
6as usual. Firms undertaking a R&D program can increase their probability to
realize a patentable innovation (by allocating more resources to research), but
they are not able to inﬂuence the size of this innovation (the level of the quali-
tative increment is drawn from the Pareto probability distribution and thus can
not be chosen or targeted). Part of the uncertainty linked to the R&D process
thus stands in the level of the quality increment.
1.3.1 Qualitative increment distribution and Patent Novelty require-
ment
Qualitative increment of innovation, or inventive steps, are heterogeneous, which
constitutes a reﬁnement of the canonical quality ladders model, where the qual-
itative increment is exogenous and constant. To avoid unnecessary complexity,
we consider that the parameter of the Pareto distribution is the same for both
regions. This parameter describes the ﬁeld of technological possibility and is
thus not inﬂuenced by the localization of the research. All the variables that
can be thought to inﬂuence the research process (the level of human capital,
the link between education and research, the eﬃciency of the National System
of Innovation, externalities from fundamental research) will be reﬂected in the
level of the Ai-parameter (a parameter indicating the productivity of the re-
search process in region i)b u tn o ti nt h eµ-parameter (the parameter of the
Pareto probability distribution).
The Patent Oﬃce in region i imposes a novelty requirement, by setting a
minimal threshold si for patent height. Hunt [1999] recalls that “To qualify
for protection (...), an invention must be novel, useful, and nonobvious. (...)
It requires that an invention represent more than a trivial advance over what
is already known”. Thus, a ﬁrm in region i must realize an innovation whose
quality increment sz over-passes this legal threshold in order to have a granted
patent.
si
z ≥ si with si > 1
By modelizing novelty requirement in this way, we implicitly assume that each
regional Patent Oﬃce is able during its granting process (which is instantaneous
in the model) to determine the level of each innovation’s qualitative step, in all
the industries of the continuum, an to compare it to the statutory requirement
si. We also consider that Patent’s law is perfectly enforced; there is no infringe-
ment of patent, nor by national or foreigner competitors. Probability to draw
a qualitative increment si









where µ is the parameter of the Pareto probability distribution (0 <µ<1).
The weaker is µ, the more diﬃcult larger quality increment are obtained (there
is more probability to obtain non-drastic innovation than to realize a drastic (or
7radical) innovation). We can express the distribution function of quality incre-


















µ and the average qualitative increment of a patentable innovation in













1.3.2 Probability to obtain a patentable innovation
A ﬁrm in region i that hires Li
Rz workers in industry z will succeed in generating

















µ is the probability that the innovation is patentable given the Pareto
probability distribution and β
i
z (t) is the probability to realize a innovation what-
ever its quality, resulting from a Poisson process. The Ai-parameter indicates
the eﬃcacy (productivity) of the research process in region i.T h eP o i s s o na r -
rival rate φ
i
z (t) i sn o tt i m ed e p e n d e n ts ot h a tw eo m i tt h et i m ei n d i c a t o r(t) in
the rest of the paper.
By taking into account the novelty requirement si, we introduce a growing
diﬃculty to realize an innovation given by the legal environment (this diﬃculty
is reinforced by the complexity of the technological improvement process: the
weaker is µ,t h em o r ed i ﬃcult is the probability to realize a patentable innova-
tion).
The maximization program of a ﬁrm of the northern region undertaking a

















is the expected innovation value. This expected innovation value
must take account the probability that this ﬁrm holds the leadership on this










nz(t) . Free entry in the R&D sector leads to the following expres-












5Since an invention takes value if and only if it can be produced.
6The maximization program for a southern ﬁrm undertaking a R&D project in sector






















81.4 Diﬀerentiated products markets
The only input for production is labor. One unit of labor is required to produce
one unit of the diﬀerentiated product z, whatever its quality. An innovative
ﬁrm just having made an innovation with a qualitative increment si
z (superior
to the patent novelty requirement in region i) has a monopoly position on the
industry z, given the perfect protection of its patent. This top-quality ﬁrm set
a limit price in order to be the only ﬁrm to serve the worldwide market for this






z(t,γ−1),w h e r eγ indicates the number of quality improvements that
have occurred in this sector until time t. The limiting price strategy is thus
pi
z (t)=si










EN (t)LN + ES (t)LS¢
(8)
We need to calculate the number of diﬀerentiated products of the continuum
that are respectively produced in the North and in the South. We focus ourselves
on the fraction of diﬀerentiated products that are manufactured in the North
region, n(t), that is the fraction of sectors of the continuum for which the
northern ﬁrms exhibit the best quality-price ratio.
Given the Pareto probability distribution for qualitative increments and the
level of the patent novelty requirements of the northern and southern regions,
the probability that the northern technological leader in the z-sector has the






































z are respectively the quality levels of a given
sector z in the North and in the South and the quality increments of the last
innovations that have appeared in sector z in the two countries. The Law of
large numbers enables to express n(t)=
R 1
0 nz (t)dz as the fraction of sectors
of the diﬀerentiated products continuum for which the technological leadership
is at the beneﬁts of the North. Using the notation gi
Q =
˙ Qi(t)
Qi(t) for the growth
rate of the average level of quality in region i and gi
w =
˙ wi(t)
wi(t) for the wage rate































where QN (0) and QS (0) were the initial values of the average level of quality
and wN (0) and wS (0) the initial value of the wage rate in both regions. With
9identical initial conditions, if the two patent novelty requirement are equals





w), then the production of the diﬀerentiated goods of the continuum is
equally shared out between the both regions (n =1 /2). This will be impossible
in our model since we postulate that wS >w N.
We are now able to deﬁne the northern balance exchange for diﬀerentiated
products BN
Z (t), the northern balance exchange for traditional goods BN
C (t)
which is always negative and global balance exchange BN (t) which is the sum




n(t)ES (t)LS − (1 − n(t))EN (t)LN¢
BN
C (t)=−(1 − σ)
(1 − δ)EN (t)LN











is the expectation of discounted proﬁts that ensue





























is the density function for the qualitative increment of a
patentable innovation and θ
i
z (t) is a risk premium resulting from the creative
destruction process that will possibly occurred in industry z at time t.T h e
region i growth rate of the innovation value equalizes the region i growth rate
of the wage rate minus the growth rate of the fraction of sectors for which the
technological leadership is at the region’s beneﬁts. The return from holding the
stock of a quality leader must be the same that the return from an equal-sized
investment in a riskless bond r(t) plus a risk premium which corresponds to
the instantaneous probability of experiencing a total capital loss du to further
































Using the law of large numbers and solving the integrals, using the probabil-


































We assume that workers can move freely and instantaneously across ﬁrms and
activities in each region. At each period, full employment of labor prevails inside
each region and wage adjusts instantaneously to equalize labor demand and
labor supply, this latter being exogenously given by the size of the population
Li (the number of consumers or households of the region). The traditional good
is produced in both the regions since δ > 0 and the southern region serves a
fraction (1−δ) of the northern demand for the traditional good. The production















































EN (t)LN + ES (t)LS¢






z (t)+δ (1 − σ)
EN (t)
δwN (t)+( 1− δ)wS (t)
=1
(15)



















2.1 Dynamical equations of the model
By deﬁnition, the average quality of diﬀerentiated products at time t in region




z (t)dz. We can calculate how Qi (t) evolves over
time, at least in steady-state equilibrium. When an innovation occurs at time t
in industry z, the level of quality of this industry jumps immediately from qz (t)
up to qz (t)=szqz (t). By applying the law of large numbers, we can calculate













































The growth rate of the fraction of the continuum whose quality-price leadership




























































Using the Keynes-Ramsey rule ( ˙ Ei (t)/Ei (t)=r(t)−ρ) and the law of evolution
of the average quality of diﬀerentiated products in each region, we can form the
dynamical system of our model with two regions. There are ﬁve dynamical
equations corresponding to ﬁve variables (EN (t), ES (t), QN (t), QS (t), n(t)).

                      



































































































































The steady-state equilibrium of the model is characterized by the constancy of
w a g er a t e sa n dc o n s u m e r se x p e n s e si ne a c hr e g i o n(
˙ EN
EN = ˙ wN
wN =
˙ Es
ES = ˙ wS
wS =0 )
and by the constancy of the fraction of goods of the continuum of diﬀerentiated
products been manufactured in each region ( ˙ n
n =0which implies two possible
and realistic steady-states : gN
Q = gS
Q and n∗ ∈ ]0,1[ or gN
Q >g S
Q and n∗ =1 ).
We will focus on the ﬁrst one (gN
Q = gS
Q and n∗ ∈ ]0,1[)w h i c hi st h eo n l y
one interesting if we consider that both regions have innovative capacities and
thus that the South produces part of the diﬀerentiated goods. The steady-


























































































The instantaneous utility functions ui ¡
sN,s S¢
of representative households in












δwN +( 1− δ)wS¢
(20)






1−µ +( 1− n)logsSwS
1−µ
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with Σ = σ logσ +( 1− σ)log(1− σ). The intertemporal utility is the dis-







u (s − t)
¢¢
ds,





ρ2. Given that both the
economies are already on their balanced growth path at time t =0(with
Qi (0) = 1 ∀i)a n dt h a tgi
u = gi
Q = gQ ( t h ec o m m o ng r o w t hr a t e ) ,t h ei n -
















The average quality of diﬀerentiated products growth rates being equals for
both regions (this is a condition for a plausible steady-state equilibrium), and
the average weighted price of diﬀerentiated products being established for the
world, diﬀerences in the level of intertemporal utility functions of the two re-





). The region which is able to catch more easily
the common growth rate (thanks to a better research productivity Ai or a larger
market (population) size Li), will consequently be able to allow more resources
to consumption and thus will enjoy a greater level of welfare.
2.3 Patent’s Novelty Requirement Setting
2.3.1 Patent’s Novelty Requirement are not harmonized
When the patent’s novelty requirement are not yet harmonized between the two
regions, both regions’ authorities have at their disposal a strategic variable that
they can use to promote an innovation and trade policy. We are thus closed
13to the Strategic Trade Policy framework developed by Brander [1981], Spencer
and Brander [1983], Brander and Spencer [1985], Eaton and Grossman [1986]
or Cheng [1988]7 but in our model the strategic variable are no longer a ﬁscal
one since these are the patent’s novelty requirement set by the Patent Oﬃce in
each region that will inﬂuence the equilibrium solution of the model8.
Each region choose its IPR protection policy (that is the level of the patent’s
novelty requirement) strategically to maximize its welfare. To characterize the
Nash equilibrium, we ﬁrst have to obtain the reactions function of the North
and the South. Let sN = RN ¡
sS¢
and sS = RS ¡
sN¢
be the reaction functions
of the North and the South.
∂UN ¡
sN,s S¢





∂sS =0 ⇒ sS = RS ¡
sN¢
(24)
The Nash equilibrium values of the two Patent’s Novelty Requirement can be
determinate as follows : sN∗ = RN ¡
RS ¡
sN∗¢¢




Unfortunately, we are not able to analytically determinate these patents heights,
so we will proceed to numerical implementations of the model in order to give
some numerical solutions in the next section.
2.3.2 Harmonized Patent’s Novelty Requirement on a Global Wel-
fare criterium
The ﬁrst possibility we can consider is that the supra-regional organization
determinates the level of the harmonized patent novelty requirement sW using











dsW =0 ⇒ sW∗
We can make two remarks on this ﬁrst alternative to realize the patent’s nov-
elty requirement harmonization: (i) the region with the largest population has
a more important weight in the choice of the patent’s novelty requirement re-
sulting from this harmonization process, (ii) there is a priori no reason that the
value of the harmonized patent’s novelty requirement be equal to the north-
ern one. Thus this way to realize the harmonization departs from the general
7We are much more closed of this latest author who considers reciprocal market model
rather than the other ones who use a three countries model where two countries compete for
market share in a third one.
8Our objective is relatively similar to the one of Lai and Qiu [2003] who examine the eﬀect
of IPR harmonization in the South on the base of the standard existing in the North. But
these authors use another characteristic of the patent as the strategic variable: its statutory
life or patent length.
14point of view that the harmonization is realized on the basis of the standards
prevailing in the North.
By maximizing the weighted sum of welfare levels, we are not sure that
welfare levels of both regions will be superior to Nash equilibrium welfare levels,
so that some compensatory measure, from the region who beneﬁts from the
harmonization to the other one who see a decrease of its welfare, could have to
be decided in order to make this harmonization acceptable for both regions.
2.3.3 Harmonized Patent’s Novelty Requirement on the basis of the
northern standard
There is of course another possibility that we can explore: the harmonization
of the patent’s novelty requirement is realized on the basis of the standard that
prevails in the north (that is the level of the northern Nash equilibrium value of
the patent’s novelty requirement). This solution leads to sW 0
= sN∗.W ep r e s e n t
in appendix the numerical simulation results of this other harmonization, in
order to compare the welfare implications of this other possibility.
2.3.4 Cooperative equilibrium
We can also calculate the patents’ novelty requirement levels that result of the
cooperative equilibrium solution when the welfare criterium is maximized by









∂sS =0 ). This is no more an harmonization process
but this can constitute an benchmark in our welfare analysis.
3 Numerical simulations
We have mentioned above that the Nash equilibrium level of patent’s novelty
requirement can not be analytically solved. In this section we exhibit and com-
ment the results of some numerical simulations of the model. This numerical
implementation of the model enables to calculate the level of each region’s patent
novelty requirement resulting of the Nash equilibrium, and the level of the har-
monized patent novelty requirement at the world level (based on the maximiza-
tion of the sum of household intertemporal welfare of the two regions)9.
The agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights
(TRIPS) ratiﬁed in 1994, stipulates that all members of the World Trade Or-
ganization must adopt a set of universal minimum standards on intellectual
property rights (IPR) protection. The numerous theoretical studies that have
balanced the pros and the cons of this agreement have usually started from
the general point of view that the terms of the agreement are based on the
9We also present in appendix the simulation results of the harmonization on the basis of
the northern standard, and the cooperative equilibrium solution.
15prevailing standards in developed countries (the North) at the time of the nego-
tiation (with the idea that the northern standards on IPR protection were more
stringent than the southern ones).
In the general equilibrium model that we have built the patent novelty
requirement in each region is determinate following the mechanism described
above, that is by confronting the reaction function of the North and the South.
The non-cooperative equilibrium values of patent’s novelty requirement of each
region depend on the value of key parameter describing the two regions economies
and the household preferences. We depart from the general point of view that
developing countries (the South) have to strengthen substantially their level of
I P Rp r o t e c t i o ni nt h es i m u l a t i o n sp r e s e nted here since, based on some plausible
values of our key parameters, the southern patent novelty requirements that
equilibrates the model is larger than northern one. In this case, the harmoniza-
tion of the South IPR standards with the northern one will not inevitably leads
to more stringent IPR in the South. The idea is that the lower wage rate and
research productivity in the south force this region to set a higher novelty re-
quirement in order to catch up the common growth rate (the one which enables
to have a balanced distribution of the diﬀerentiated products market share, that
is a stable n).
3.1 Simulation results
The choice of the optimal patent’s novelty requirement by the authority of each
region plays a important role on resources allocation process inside each econ-
omy since the level of the patent’s novelty requirement determines the incentive
to do research, and inﬂuences the choice between allocation of labor to manu-
facture diﬀerentiated goods or to produce traditional goods. The optimal level
of the patent novelty requirement in a region i chosen by the authority is de-
pendent of values taken by the key parameters describing its own characteristics
(research capacity Ai, size of the population and of the market Li,l e v e lo ft h e
wage rate wi) relatively to values taken by the same characteristics in the other
region. The optimal patent’s novelty requirement level is also inﬂuenced by
the value of variables describing the household preferences (ρ, σ)a n db yt h e
value of the parameter that calibrates the diﬃculty of the research process (δ).
The level of the patent’s novelty requirement is at last inﬂuenced by the dif-
ferentiated products trade ﬂows equilibrium (determining the level of n)s i n c e
the steady state equilibrium of the model requires the diﬀerentiated products
quality growth rates to be equal. The ease which with a region obtains the com-
mon growth rate determines the quantity of resources this region allocates to
research. When a region exhibits an high capacity in research and development
(A) or a large population (L), the level of the patent’s novelty requirement to
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Table 1: Numerical simulations results
With the endogenous growth framework that we have adopted, there could
not exist a transitional dynamics between two steady states since the control
and state variable jump immediately to their new levels. But the diﬀerence
existing between the relative average qualities ratio of two steady states imposes
an adjustment since the quality levels of each region must adjust themselves
in order to be compatible with the relative average qualities ratio of the new
steady state. For example, given the values adopted for the key parameters of




whereas it equals 4.28 in the centralized equilibrium. This diﬀerence implies that
there would be a dynamical adjustment between the two steady states. This
could have important consequence on welfare since this transitional dynamics
could reverse the results in terms of welfare (see Koléda [2004b]). In this paper
we only focus on the steady states and ignore the transitional dynamics. This
static comparative framework is justiﬁed by the fact that the supra-regional
authority that realize the harmonization of patents novelty requirements use as


















sW =1 .2855 61.7 27.4 143.9
Harmonization
on the base of the
northern PNR




sS0 =1 .434 60.5 27.9 144.2
Table 2: Welfare results of numerical simulations
Between the non cooperative and cooperative equilibrium, we can notice
that the choice realized about the arbitrage between dynamic eﬃcacy and static
ineﬃciency of the patent’s novelty requirement is diﬀerent but leads to the same
results in terms of welfare. In the case that we have retained, the harmonization
is not the best solution in terms of welfare.
3.1.1 Compensatory measure
Concerning the compensatory measure in terms of trade liberalization that can
be adopted in order to compensate the welfare decrease in southern region that
results from the harmonization, our ﬁndings is quite surprising since it indicates
that a increase in protectionist measure would enable the southern region to
increase its welfare. Qiu and Lai [2005] advance a quite similar result, using a
North-South trade model with innovation and imitation, “The globally optimal
Northern tariﬀ increases as IPR protection in the North and the South decreases.
Global welfare may rise as Northern tariﬀ increases (...)”.
The numerical simulation results with δ =0 .2 (increase of the imports quota
of southern traditional products by the North) and δ =0 .275 (more stringent
quota for southern traditional products imports by the North) are presented in
appendix.
The mechanism is the following. By imposing a more stringent quota, the
North forces the South to reduce its labor allocation to traditional goods pro-
duction. These resources are thus allocated to diﬀerentiated goods production
and thus the welfare increases in the south. On the contrary, the northern re-
gion has to allocate more resources to traditional goods production and thus do
18less research and the frequency of innovation decreases. The common growth
rate is lower so that the south will catch it more easily (and its market share of
diﬀerentiated products is higher).
3.2 Discussion
3.2.1 Link with existing literature
In an open economy, the trade-oﬀ between the marginal dynamic beneﬁta n d
the static eﬃciency loss du to patent policy is not as clear as in country closed
to international trade (see Koléda [2004a] for a analysis of this trade-oﬀ in a
quality ladder growth model in which the patent’s novelty requirement is taken
into account). International trade of diﬀerentiated products spreads the ben-
eﬁts of innovation beyond national (regional) boundaries and thus, a country
(region) can not monopolize all the beneﬁts coming from protecting IPR within
its borders10. As argued by Grossman and Lai [2004]: “It is not obvious how
a government ought to set its national IPR policy if some of the beneﬁts of its
national innovation accrue to foreigners, if its constituents beneﬁtf r o mi n n o v a -
tion that are encouraged and take place beyond its boundaries, and if domestic
and foreign ﬁrms diﬀer in their ability to innovate”.
Previous research has addressed the question of whether a country or region
with no or few capacity to innovate will beneﬁt from extending or strengthening
its Intellectual Property Rights protection. Helpman [1993] has ﬁrst evaluated
the welfare consequences of change in the rate of imitation or northern prod-
ucts by southern ﬁrms in a general equilibrium framework. But there was no
simultaneous choice of IPR protection by trade partners an thus no possibility
to discuss of the optimality of an international regime of IPR protection.
The paper of Lai and Grossman [2004] and Qiu and Lai [2003] are much closer
of the framework developed in this one. These authors also study the incentives
that national authorities have to protect intellectual property in a trading world
economy. Grossman and Lai associate the strength of IPR protection to an
index that captures both the country’s patent length and the stringency of
its enforcement policy. They study a patent regime with national treatment,
where the same protection is oﬀered to all inventors irrespective of their nation
of origin. They ﬁnd that if the capacity for research and development is greater
in the North than in the South and the market for innovative products is at
least as large there, then patent protection will be stronger in the North than
in the South in a Nash equilibrium. Deriving the properties of an eﬃcient
global regime of IPR, that is a regime that is incentive for both countries, they
10Even in our model with no knowldege externalities and no possibility to patent abroad,
the beneﬁts of strenghtening IPR protection in one region spreads all over the world since
the both regions’ consumers will enjoy a better quality-price ratio for diﬀerentiated products
if the marginal dynamic beneﬁt (the quality growth) exceeds the static eﬃciency loss (the
increase of the mark-up).
19ﬁnd that there is various combination of patent policies in the two countries
providing optimal aggregate incentive for innovation. Among combinations of
policies that give the same overall incentive for global research, the North fares
better, and the South worse, the stronger is patent protection in the South. The
implication of this ﬁn d i n g si st h a th a r m o n i z a t i o no fp a t e n tp o l i c i e si sn e i t h e r
necessary nor suﬃcient condition for global eﬃciency.
Lai and Qiu [2002] compare the Nash equilibrium IPR protection standard
of the South with that of the North and ﬁnd that the former is naturally weaker
than the latter. They show that both regions can gain from an agreement re-
quiring South to harmonize its IPR standards with those of the North an the
North to liberalize its traditional goods market. This is all the opposite of our
own results!
Since the patent characteristic that we use in this model play a important
role in determining the average mark-up in the economy (and not only the
duration of the monopoly as it is the case when the light is put on the length
characteristic) a stronger level of the patent novelty requirement is not inevitably
linked with a higher level of welfare as long as the patent ineﬃciency eﬀect is
stronger than its dynamic beneﬁt. Thus the more developed countries, with
more important innovation capacities, are able to set a weaker threshold for the
patentability requirement. This weaker patent height set by northern countries
implies that there is more innovation (the frequency of innovation is higher) but
with weaker average inventive step. The weaker patent height set in the North
enables a weaker average mark-up of northern ﬁrms and thus a greater level of
welfare.
The surprising result of our model that the harmonization is made on the
basis of a weaker patent’s novelty requirement is therefor theoretically funded.
Given the mechanism described above and the fact that patents novelty require-
ments are strategic complements, this result is straightforward. By lowering the
patent’s novelty requirement level during the harmonization process, the supra-
regional authority enables to lower the ineﬃciency eﬀect of patent. The average
size of innovation decreases but the frequency of innovation becomes higher, so
that the outcome in terms of average quality growth rate11 is not determined a
priori (globally, we can say that the growth rate of quality is quite constant or
weakly evolves depending on the values retained for the simulations).
All in all, the harmonization process, conducing to a lower patent’s novelty
requirement, can produce two positive eﬀects :
• a decrease of the average mark-up for diﬀerentiated products all over the
two regions that follows the decrease of patent’s novelty requirement in
both regions (the ineﬃciency eﬀect of patent protection weakens and thus
welfare levels increase in both regions),
11See Horowitz and Lai [1996] for a deep analysis of the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e ni n n o v a t i o ns i z e
and frequency.
20• a potentially increase of the common quality growth rate if the higher
frequency implies by the lower patent’s novelty requirement is more im-
portant that the decrease in the average size of innovation. Nevertheless,
if the average quality growth rate increases, the diﬃculty to catch this
common growth rate increases for the south which must allocate more re-
sources to research and reduces its consumption (this is why the southern
welfare level decreases).
3.2.2 Is the model plausible?
Since we depart from the general point of view than the harmonization process
leads to strengthen the IPR standard in the southern region (focusing our analy-
sis on the patent height characteristic), the question which must be asked is the
empirical plausibility of this model. We present two measure of the relative
strength of patent rights across countries found in the economics of patent lit-
erature. The ﬁrst one is the index constructed by Ginarte and Park [1997].
The second is the index constructed by Rapp and Rozek [1990]. The index con-
structed by Park and Ginarte [1997] is the unweighted sum of scores given to ﬁve
aspects of national patent laws : (1) the extent of coverage, (2) the membership
in international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss or protection, (4) en-
forcement mechanisms and (5) duration of the protection. The index developed
by Rapp and Rozek [1990] is based on surveys of business and governments
oﬃcials and on a examination of patent laws themselves. This index measures
conformity of each nation’s patent regulations and enforcement to the minimum
standards put forward by the US Chamber of Commerce Intellectual Property
Task Force in 1987.
Ginarte & Park [1997]
Index of patent rights
(1990)
Rapp & Rozek [1990]
Relative strength
of patent laws
Park & Wagh [2002]
Index of patent rights
(2000)
US 4.52 5.33 5.00
Canada 2.76 5.04 3.90
France 3.9 5.18 4.05
Italy 4.05 4.84 4.33
Germany 3.71 4.30 4.52
Japan 3.94 4.55 4.19
UK - 4.44 4.19
Table 3: Index of patent rights : Northern countries
These indexes clearly indicate that the IPR protection is stronger in the
North than in the South. But what really indicate these indexes ? We can no-
tice that the indexes presented in the two tables much more measure the eﬀec-
tiveness of judicial procedures, the deterrent to imitation provide by the patent
21Ginarte & Park [1997]
Index of patent rights
(1990)
Rapp & Rozek [1990]
Relative strength
of patent laws
Park & Wagh [2002]
Index of patent rights
(2000)
India 1.48 2.29 2.18
Korea 3.94 3.56 4.19
South Africa 3.57 4.03 4.05
Brazil 1.85 2.09 3.05
Argentina 2.26 2.51 3.33
Mexico 1.63 2.29 2.86
China - - 2.48
Turkey - 1.93 2.86
Table 4: Index of patent rights : Southern countries
system, the existence of compulsory licensing mechanism potentially leading to
withdrawal of foreign patent, than it indicates the stringency of the granting
process (for example the ﬁrst aspect of the Park and Ginarte index (extent of
the coverage) indicates the fraction of items that are patentable but does not
give indication on novelty and nonobviouness requirements during the granting
process). Thus higher indexes of patent rights for northern countries do not
indicate that these countries have automatically a greater patent height.
Patent height is something diﬃcult to appreciate or calculate. Perhaps the
better indicator would be a ratio of patent grants to patent applications. For
example France and Germany are closed in terms of Index of patent’s rights
whereas the ratio of the number of granted patent to the number of patent ap-
plications are very diﬀerent (90% for France, around 33% for Germany) which
indicates that German Patent Oﬃce imposes a greater patent novelty require-
ment than French Patent Oﬃce does.
3.3 Loose ends
An important caveat to the results of the model is the lack of knowledge ex-
ternalities between the two regions and the impossibility to apply for patent
abroad. These restrictions of the model limits its ability to fully characterize
the welfare outcome of the TRIP agreement. In our model, the emphasis is put
on the following mechanism: the greater incentive to innovate given by a greater
patent’s novelty requirement level (and so on the higher growth rate) is balanced
with the higher mark-up level implied by this greater PNR (potentially leading
to loss in diﬀerentiated products market share). Other important aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights are not taken into account: the struggle against
imitation is not examined since we do not consider the existence of imitation,
the possibility to earn royalties based on licensing agreements (see Young and
22Maskus [2001] for a discussion of this aspect) is also not taken into account.
Another critic that can be address to our model is the way we determine
the steady-state equilibrium. We focus on a steady state equilibrium with a
balanced level of the fraction of sectors for which the leadership goes to the
North. We have already highlight the point that the long term solutions of
all other equilibria lead to n(∞)=1which degenerates the model but the
facts much more exhibit a divergence of northern and southern growth rates.
Our model must only be considered for the analysis of competition between
the North and some new developed countries in the South that hold strong
innovative capacities.
At last, we can regret the focus on a static comparative framework and the
lack of the dynamical analysis from the non-cooperative equilibrium towards
the harmonized or cooperative equilibrium. The regional wage rates evolution
would greatly inﬂuence the welfare gain or loss in both regions since, in our
model, there exists a inverse relation between the wage rate and the patent’s
novelty requirement level.
Conclusion
The results of the numerical simulations that we have run, based on plausible
values for key parameters of the model, imply that the South adopts a higher
patent’s novelty requirement than the North in the Nash equilibrium solution,
in order to keep a fraction of the market of diﬀerentiated products and to grow
at the same rate than the North.
The Intellectual Property Rights harmonization leads to weaken the patent’s
novelty requirement. The harmonization process is therefore able to produce
the two following positive eﬀects: (i) a decrease of the average mark-up for dif-
ferentiated products all over the two regions that follows the decrease of patent’s
novelty requirement in both regions (the ineﬃciency eﬀect of patent protection
weakens and thus welfare levels increase in both regions), (ii) a potentially in-
crease of the common quality growth rate if the higher frequency implies by the
lower patent’s novelty requirement is more important that the decrease in the
average size of innovation.
In terms of welfare, the harmonization always increases the northern wel-
fare whereas it decreases the southern welfare. One of the mechanism that
explains this last result is the following: when the average quality growth rate
increases, the diﬃculty to catch this common growth rate increases for the south
which must allocate more resources to research and thus reduces its consump-
tion. Compensatory measures must theref o r eb ee n v i s a g e di no r d e rt om a k et h i s
harmonization process welfare-improving for both regions.
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Determination of steady-state variables expression
Here ate the calculus for the steady state with only the probability to innnovate
in its own region for the risk premium and the possibilty that the south serves




































































AN =1 wN =4 LN =1 δ = 0.2





































AN =1 wN =4 LN =1 δ = 0.275
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Table 6: Numerical simulations results
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